A adequação do sistema de gestão monetário nacional como pressuposto para efetividade do compromisso democrático constitucional

Abstract

This doctoral thesis aims to analyse the system of management of Brazilian monetary policy, especially as regards democratic accountability, transparency, and instruments of control. The main focus of the analysis is to consider the model’s constitutional conformity, with an emphasis on the achievement of constitutional objectives. Based on a hermeneutic-legal interpretation, considering transparency and social control as essential elements for achieving democratic and republican ideals, we seek to analyse the activities undertaken for monetary policy management and mechanisms of monitoring and social control, as well as the conformity of these instruments to the full exercise of citizenship and to the effectiveness of the constitutional intention. For this, its starting point is a brief discussion of the historical concept of money and the importance of monetary policies and their relationship to the state and the law, which have created the circumstances and conditionalities that guide monetary management today. As paradigms for discussing the Brazilian model, the monetary management systems of the USA, Germany, Japan and Chile are presented and discussed: countries from different continents, distinct from each other, but representative of developed economies able to provide critical comparative analysis to the Brazilian system. Following this, by reconstructing the country's monetary management history, for the purpose of understanding the origins of the current management model, an analysis of its constitutional conformity is presented, confirming that the current institutional structure is not adequately adapted to the 1998 Federal Constitution, especially with regard to constitutional objectives and paradigms of transparency, control and social participation. As a result, it is also shown that a model of transparent monetary management with social control is presupposed under democratic and republican principles, and this constitutional non-conformity also represents an impediment to the full incorporation of fundamental constitutional objectives, hindering the process of affirming and enacting fundamental rights. Finally, given the above, there is a need for change in the institutional framework of monetary management with a view to realising its constitutional adequacy and conformity. Likewise, such assumptions are indispensable to avoid the deviation of monetary policy from the public interest to the benefit of private interests. Some proposals are suggested for inclusion in a draft Monetary Responsibility Law, which is needed to change these institutional shortcomings that have been used repeatedly as a way of thwarting the Brazilian democratic constitutional commitment.