Análise do princípio responsabilidade de Hans Jonas a partir do diálogo com Paul Ricoeur

Abstract

Ethical awareness of the imponderable consequences of man-made action in today's time, which are in tune with the destruction of the environment in the light of moral responsibility, will be the central basis of this philosophical reflection. The present doctoral dissertation aims, therefore, to philosophically analyze the concept of Responsibility formulated by Hans Jonas in the work The Responsibility Principle: Test of an Ethics for Technological Civilization, through dialogue with Paul Ricoeur, especially from the works The same as another and the just I: justice as a rule and as an institution, in order to understand the PR of Jonah, the legitimacy of moral responsibility for the future, the otherness and the importance given to the feelings present in the theses of both philosophers and, still , reflect on the applicability of this new concept of Responsibility in the field of politics (Jonas) and in the legal field (Ricoeur). For Hans Jonas the concept of Responsibility is the principle that seeks to configure a new ethics of the future that is not restricted to pure formalism, therefore, based on ontology, metaphysics, virtue and a sense of responsibility, but also , which aims to reach a significant space in the field of deontology, without, however, being understood as a new categorical imperative, but as a guide for a new action of man, within the scope of moral responsibility and facing the advance and mastery of technique. For Paul Ricoeur, a responsibility that also seeks to break with pure formalism through practical wisdom in relations of justice, highlighting the feelings of friendship-solicitude from the respect due to others, having otherness as a reference and corroborating the thesis. of the first, with relevant emphasis, as the best grounded path for moral philosophy considering the future of humanity. Ricoeur and Jonas find in otherness, duty to each other, and overestimation of the second person as a sine qua non condition for the self (Ricoeur's self and future being for Jonas) as the foundation for a responsibility that results from feelings, affections and inclinations, but which also guides the field of justice, laws, politics and reverberates Kantian formalism with reservations. Ricoeur thus concludes that we need a new imperative to impose action so that there are still human beings behind us. However, this needs to be different from Kant's second imperative, which considers the contemporaneity between the agent and his counterpart. We need a new imperative that considers responsibility without requiring duration, proximity or reciprocity. To this end, we have the Hans Jonas Responsibility Principle.