Da ética do indizível à função do silêncio no tractatus logico-philosophicus de Wittgenstein

Abstract

The current presentation analyzes the sense in which Wittgenstein invites us to the silence from his last aphorism in Tractactus logico-philophicus 1921, which has oriented this work: " Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent. " Observe oneselt that the silence occupies a place of identity, that is, It will be necessary to keep itselt, protect itselt, because it is from silence to Wittgenstein, that it will be possible to find the “clarity” that is sought over the bad use of the language. The silence is, therefore, the hiatus between what is said and what is unsaid, in it are the conditions of the possibility to a comprehension from that is still to be said, but it can only be shown. Paradoxically, to Wittgenstein once more the silence represents the attitude, because to him, the meaning of life could not be enough or logically explained through the logic systems. According to Wittgenstein is thesis, there is a limit for the language that is, our language is insuffcient and therefore, it would be