Emoções cognitivas: Nussbaum e o neoestoicismo

Abstract

This writing aims to present the theory of cognitive emotions of Martha Nussbaum and arouse the pertinent questions towards it. In order to do so, the bibliographical research will be the method chosen aligned with the referential book Upheavals of Thought (2008). The writing itself will be a decriptive one combining the author’s justifications along with the proposal’s supportive authors. Nussbaum claims a reavaluation of the stoic’s theory of emotions so it can include non-human animals and children in a eudaimonic-evaluative cognitivist theory. Therefore, she resorts to science and psychology thinkers, such as Seligman, Lazarus, Damasio, Ledoux, Stern and Winnicott. Nussbaum’s definition of emotions, based on Chrysippus’ theory, is the main object of this paper work and the consequent questions, as well as the author’s premises, will be discussed with objections and exemplifications. By the end of this writing we intend to ponder over the author’s conceptual rigorosity, its contributions and the aspects needed of improvement. Nussbaum can be considered an important contributor to the handling of emotions that are social and about the world, that reveal values, whereas she might benefit from a more rigorous treatment with her reinterpretation of logos and the assessments of non-cognitivist theories and their claims. Emotions are rich sources of philosophical analysis and should be taken as such in the pursuit of a humane society and human flourishing.