O Ministério Público sob uma perspectiva sistêmica: independência funcional, unidade institucional e organização.

Abstract

The thesis proposes to analyze the Public Prosecutor's Office as an organization within the Luhmanianna perspective, especially with regard to functional independence, unity and the protection of fundamental rights, promoting the conditions for functional differentiation and structuring of complexity. This analysis will present, in the end, depending on the ministerial action in the face of COVID-19, a time frame able to highlight the Public Ministry as an organization, its premise of political decision embodied in the choice of the Attorney General of the Republic and its network of internal decisions , paradoxized by functional independence and institutional unity. The object will be the structural design of the institution, unity and functional independence. There will be an observation of the (non) systemic action of the parquet, demonstrating the closure of the ministerial system and eventual inconsistencies, in front of a constitutional panel where the choice of the Attorney General of the Republic shows a non-updating of the functional differentiation. According to Luhmann, organizations produce their own decision-making capacity, and the maintenance and improvement of this capacity is the true criterion of effective organization and this is what can be a contribution of the analysis of the Public Prosecutor's Office organization from the systemic perspective. When choosing the Attorney General of the Republic, the entire organization, which is codified by the system of law and the decision premises, gets irritated and reacts, whether they identify with the choice. Unity and functional independence are put to the test and the system may react with a preponderance of unity or functional independence. When the political system advances over the system of law, the tendency is for unity or functional independence to de-paradoxize, building inconsistencies. The option of the constituent, in addition to not responding to the hypercomplexity, based on democratic advances, on collective guidelines (environmental, for example) and on the reformulation of judicial review, weakens the new mechanisms of defense of constitutional guarantees and the control of the system of law. in relation to the political system, essential for autopoiesis. The choice of action in the face of COVID, in the period of 2020, serves to present a north to be traveled, via circular risk management, and to present some reflections on the Federal Public Prosecutor's Office organization.