Creencia, acción y posteridad un estudio de la creencia en la filosofía pragmatista de William James

Abstract

Se trata de examinar la concepción pragmática de la creencia en el pensamiento de William James con el fin de alinear una filosofía de la creencia y de la acción. Se aspira a evaluar el papel de las creencias al interior del pragmatismo clásico una vez resuelta su naturaleza como hábitos de conducta. Introducido el itinerario del pragmatismo como una lógica filosófica de la investigación tal como fuera planteado por Charles Sanders Peirce, son presentadas las teorías de la creencia de sus principales exponentes. Entramos a la cobertura central del pragmatismo en su aspecto prospectivo con el argumento de la “voluntad de creer” según el cual las creencias como hipótesis son postulados racionales en el mundo para la acción posible. Consideramos así cómo llegan a afectar a la posteridad con respecto a las acciones impulsadas y hechas posibles gracias a nuestra

This is an attempt to consider the pragmatic concept of belief in the thought of William James in order to align a philosophy of belief and action. The aim is thereby to evaluate the role of beliefs within classical pragmatism once resolved their nature as habits of conduct. After introducing the path of pragmatism as a philosophical logic of inquiry as initially proposed by Charles Sanders Peirce, are presented the diverse theories of belief of its main exponents. We will enter the central coverage of pragmatism in its prospective aspect alongside its "will to believe" thesis, according to which our beliefs as hypothesis are posited as rational postulates for possible action. Here we will be considering how they may affect posterity regarding the actions driven and made possible by our convictions in them. Beliefs are to be discovered therefore not as opposite but as guidelines for action

This is an attempt to consider the pragmatic concept of belief in the thought of William James in order to align a philosophy of belief and action. The aim is thereby to evaluate the role of beliefs within classical pragmatism once resolved their nature as habits of conduct. After introducing the path of pragmatism as a philosophical logic of inquiry as initially proposed by Charles Sanders Peirce, are presented the diverse theories of belief of its main exponents. We will enter the central coverage of pragmatism in its prospective aspect alongside its "will to believe" thesis, according to which our beliefs as hypothesis are posited as rational postulates for possible action. Here we will be considering how they may affect posterity regarding the actions driven and made possible by our convictions in them. Beliefs are to be discovered therefore not as opposite but as guidelines for action.