| dc.description.abstract | This work addresses the legitimacy and the limits of the decisions of the courts of
accounts (general accounting offices) regarding primary government activities. The
main questions for the development of this research were: after all, what are the
courts of accounts? can they oversee public policies? when does the court of
accounts make a bad decision in the oversight of primary government activities?
what are the limits of a democratic decision in the oversight of the government? To
understand the place of the courts of accounts in the institutional design, we have
adopted the contributions of the administrative state, whose underlying logic points to
the existence of independent institutions that function based on technicalities.
Therefore, this work analyses the deference of the Judiciary to such institutions,
considering, within this design, the place of the courts of accounts. Additionally, this
work discusses the implications of the constitutional provision that increases the
possibility of a qualitative oversight of the government through operational audits
considering standards of legality, legitimacy, and economy. Thus, the issues
discussed in this work specifically in terms of oversight of primary government
activities revolve around the idea of (non)discretion, both of the government and the
accounting offices. Our study was based on the notions of Autonomy of Law and the
Adequate Response to the Constitution, which are important attributes to guide the
limits of the activities of the courts of accounts on issues of this nature. In this
context, the use of a prognostic model of oversight and the understanding that
legality should not be conceived in its strict sense — but as having the Constitution
as a parameter ("constitutional legality") — emerge as elements capable of
conferring legitimacy to the oversight conducted by courts of accounts over primary
government activities, while also limiting that oversight. | en |
