| dc.description.abstract | The present work analyzes the changes that the Law of Introduction to the Norms
of Brazilian Law - LINDB has undergone. Through Law No. 13.655/2018, 10
articles were inserted in the text of LINDB, among which is article 20, which is the
focus of this work, determining that administrative, judicial and controlling
decisions will not be decided based on values abstract legal frameworks without
considering the practical consequences of the decision. This article raises a series
of questions, ranging from an understanding of what it actually means to consider
practical consequences, how they should be considered and to what extent they
should be considered, as well as what other elements must be present in order for
them to be considered. can actually reach a correct decision. In addition to the
provision brought by LINDB, the Constitution itself already establishes the duty to
state reasons, which is present in art. 93, IX. Thus, aiming to develop points that
contribute to a debate around the positive changes in LINDB, the present work is
divided into three parts: in the first chapter, we sought to characterize the path of
LINDB, from the Law of Introduction to the Civil Code to the to the changes
promoted through Law No. 13,655, then, we sought to analyze the
consequentialism present in art. 20 from LINDB; consequentialism was also
analyzed, and a debate was held with Ronald Dworkin's theory of right as
integrity. In the second chapter, the reconstruction of some points of the “second
debate” between Richard Posner and Ronald Dworkin was carried out. This
debate is important because it brings points that help in understanding the
analysis of consequences in decisions. While Posner has a view from
pragmatism, Dworkin carries out a harsh critique of pragmatism, and, among other
points, defends the role of principles in the assessment of consequences. Not that
the analysis of consequences is something that the decision should completely
depart from, but, as Dworkin will demonstrate, the principles are fundamental so
that the consequences do not reflect something merely personal. The third
chapter sought to delimit the bases for an understanding of the constitutionally
adequate response, built by Streck. Likewise, the reading of art. 20 of LINDB
through the conjugation of art. 489, §1 of the CPC, together with art. 93, IX of the
Federal Constitution, in order to enable a correct understanding of
consequentialism in legal decisions. | en |
