dc.description.abstract | The research unites the problem of information asymmetry present in the agency relationship, analyzed focusing on the relationship between the agent, elected executive (mayors), representing the principal, which is the legislative power (City Council). Aiming to analyze the perception of the use of management accounting information as a mechanism to minimize informational asymmetry in the relationship between municipal managers and the legislative power. In this line, the diversified scope of financial information originated from management accounting (CG) is attributed as mitigating asymmetry, allowing the legislative power (PL) to better develop the supervision of the elected executive, resulting in better alignment between agent and principal, a role of governance tool in the public sector. For this, there was an exploratory and descriptive research, with theoretical nature of the problem, a qualitative problem, with the use of data collected in 2020, primary and secondary, collected in the municipalities of the southwest region of the state of Mato Grosso, using the statistical technique of multiple linear regression to test the hypotheses, with quantitative approach. The findings indicate that the information generated by management accounting has the role of governance tool and reduces the asymmetry of information between elected managers and the legislature at the municipal level. The results are sufficient to understand how management accounting information and tools can mitigate the existing agency conflict in the public sector, just as its use can aid the external control exercised by the legislative branch. It was also possible to realize that public sector entities focus on disclosures of legal charges, that is, purely financial information. The research contributes to the literature, complementing it with the understanding by the public sector entities surveyed about the role of information generated by management accounting, a fundamental element for the reduction of informational asymmetry in the public sector. | en |