| dc.description.abstract | Among the nexus of contracts that make up the company, it is possible to glimpse quite often the so-called agency contracts, in which there is the presence of a principal who entrusts the agent to perform a certain service on his behalf that implies the delegation of some power of decision. In the case of family businesses, it is possible to observe this type of contract in the relations of the partners with each other, as well as between partners and managers, when one of these is delegated to deliberate on the business on behalf of the other. As a result of the incompleteness of these contracts, as well as the fact that the agents are imperfect, may exist conflicts of interest inherent in these relationships, since the agent may seek to serve his own interests and not those of the principal. Corporate governance mechanisms appear in the literature as a tool to achieve the mitigation of these agency conflicts. The present study seeks to investigate, through the analysis of two family companies that went through the processes of implementation of these mechanisms, what were the perceived impacts regarding agency relations, from the partners' perspective. | en |
