O efeito do controle acionário e da gestão familiar na criação de valor e no desempenho operacional das companhias abertas brasileiras

Abstract

The present research investigated if traded family firms, from the period of 2005 to 2012, have creating value, operating performance, leverage and administrative costs differentiated in comparison to non-family firms. Besides it was investigated differences in performance among the family firms in different management models. The results for the variables of value and performance demonstrated sensitivity depending on the concept of family firms used. For family firms under the wider concept (CF1), the results for creating value and operating performance are lower than private non-family companies. For other concepts of family firms (CF2 and CF3) there is no statistical difference between the results. Through these findings it is assumed that the family non majority equity control, the division of the company control in several families and the absence of the founding family in the company, lower the performance of family firms. In the analysis of leverage levels the results indicate that only the family firms where the founding family (CF3) still has great influence are more leveraged. Regarding for the metric of administrative expenses the family firms under the wider concept (CF1) reported higher expenses in relation to the non-family, showing greater agency conflicts between controllers and minority shareholders in these companies. The more efficient model of management in terms of market value for family firms is the Family Management Founder. All results are confirmed in the Robustness analyzes.