| dc.description.abstract | The objective of the present study is to analyze the institutional forms of oil production regulation in United States, Brazil, Argentina and Venezuela, especially the contractual point of view these countries grant the exploration in its territories and about the level of direct intervention of the State in this exploration. Regulation about public utility services tends to especially accommodate the interests of lobbies, the regulated industries and the consumers, as form to support government politician. Therefore, is necessary adds in the economic regulation theory the institutional aspect about the countries like element-key in the valuation if one or another interest group through the intervention in the economy for regulation. Oil is a strategical product in the scene of the international economy, and therefore the States tend to support or to create companies for oil production, being looked for to participate in profits for its extraction. Four different realities how much production, consumption, capacity of refining and commerce of the oil was studied. Moreover, the forms of distinct institutional arrangements had been analyzed for which these countries regulate the exploration of the oil in its territories, either through contracts of concession and institutionalization sector regulating agencies, as the United States, or only with concession contracts without regulating agencies, as in the Argentine case. In the Venezuelan case, only contract of joint-venture between the private initiative and the state-owned company of exploration exists, without regulating agency. Saudi Arabia does not possess regulating agency and explores the extration of oil directly for the company of the subject, of which it withholds 100% of participation, and thus contracts only specific services, without concession. Finally the Brazilian case, where there is concession contract, as well as regulating agency of the sector and a company of state capital acting in the market. | en |
