| dc.description.abstract | The aim of this thesis was to analyze if the investment decision of institutional investors is supported by the fact of companies which belong to different levels of corporate governance at BM&FBOVESPA. What happens is that the separation of ownership and control in modern enterprise is highly related to the general problem of agency. The asymmetry of information, along with the various provisions to take risks and the emergency of conflicts of interests, makes up the basic assumptions of the problem of agency. Therefore, the research was conducted by presenting this theoretical basis, in addition to national and international empirical studies whose relationship between corporate governance and institutional investors was evident. Similar studies, aiming at only private security institutes and not institutional investors on its totality, were found at national level. The thesis discusses the evidence quantitatively, and performs analyzes in an explanatory way. For data analysis, it was used linear regression with panel data. The positive relationship found through econometric regression is proof that companies listed on differentiated levels of corporate governance are more attractive to institutional investors. The fact that other variables compose the econometric model tested, and have been run models with different periods (4 to 10 years) and analyzed balanced and unbalanced panels, demonstrates the robustness of this thesis. The same could contribute to future studies, since compares information from the Brazilian stock exchange to a study in the American market. | en |
